This paper presents a non-uniform static analysis for detecting the term-substitution property in infinite cryptographic processes specified by the language of the spi calculus. The analysis is fully compositional following the denotational approach throughout. This renders the implementation of the analysis straightforward in functional programming. The results are then used to detect certain security breaches, like information leakage and authenticity breaches. As an example of its applicability, we apply the analysis to the SPLICE/AS protocol and the FTP server.
Introduction
The spi calculus [1] offers a process algebraic theory for the modelling of mobile cryptographic systems that essentially extends the value-passing theory of the -calculus [2] by the addition of primitives for performing cryptographic operations. We view the cryptographic operations as adding extra value-processing behaviour to processes. One aspect of the value-passing and value-processing behaviours that has significance when detecting security breaches in processes is term substitution. Term substitutions occur whenever communications as well as successful decryption, signature verification and tuple splitting, take place. Security implications arise in scenarios where a process classified at a low secrecy level obtains high-level data, or a process classified at a high trust level obtains low-level data. We term the former information leakage and the latter authenticity breach.
In this paper, we propose a non-uniform static analysis that captures the property of term substitutions in the spi calculus. The analysis is non-uniform in the sense that it is capable of distinguishing between the different instances of these substitutions. The analysis is based on a closed denotational model of the language derived from Stark's domain-theoretic equations for the -calculus [3] . Apart from facilitating the use of computationally important mathematical concepts, like fixed points, the denotational approach has the advantage that it results in an implementation straightforward in functional programming. The adopted abstraction limits, in a sound manner, the number of new names and the depth of data structures, both of which can grow, in concrete semantics, to an infinite level as a result of the presence of replication in infinite systems. Since the abstract domain is kept finite, least fixed point calculations are guaranteed to terminate for our monotonic semantic functions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the main contributions of this paper. In Section 3, we give an overview of related work. In Section 4, we review the syntax and structural operational semantics of the spi calculus. In Section 5, we define a domain-theoretic model for processes in the spi calculus and give a concrete definition of the elements of this model. A denotational semantics is then given as a function from syntactical processes to elements of the semantic domains. In Section 6, a non-standard semantics is defined that captures the property of term substitution. In Section 7, a sound approximation is defined that limits the size of the semantic domain to a finite limit. In Section 8, we give a specification of Dolev-Yao's most general attacker. In Section 9, we define secrecy and authenticity breaches in terms of the state resulting from application of the static analysis. These definitions are used to analyse the effects of one attack on the SPLICE/AS protocol in Section 10. In Section 11, we give another example emphasising the non-uniformity of the analysis to detect key usage in a secure FTP system. In Section 12, we review the design of the Spicaso tool, an implementation of the static analysis in OCAML. We conclude the paper in Section 13 and discuss future work.
Main contributions
Denotational semantics. The paper defines a sound and adequate denotational semantics for the spi calculus. The semantics is based on the predomain equations presented by Stark in [3] for the -calculus extending these equations to include a predomain of complex terms and permitting the presence of complex terms as messages of output actions. These modifications allow for the modelling of the cryptographic capabilities of processes in the spi calculus. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time such a domain-theoretic model is defined for the spi calculus.
The static analysis of spi calculus. The paper presents a static analysis for reasoning about the term-substitution property in mobile cryptographic systems that are potentially infinite. The analysis is non-uniform in that it can distinguish between the different instances of bound names (local data) and variables belonging to the different copies of replicated processes. It also caters for the presence of intruder processes (e.g. the network) that exhibit potentially harmful behaviour, by allowing the specification of the most general attacker to be included in the analysis of any system. Finally, the approach adopted is fully denotational, rather than the usual operational approach adopted in many analyses. This approach has the following advantages:
• The resulting theory is often simple and close to its implementation in functional programming. The use of the operational approach in constructing static analyses for calculi of mobility has often resulted in complex analyses that are difficult to implement (e.g. [4] ).
• Certain mathematical concepts that are computationally significant, like domains and least fixed points, are directly available for the theory and implementation of the static analysis.
• Finally, a denotational model allows for program properties (in our case, the term substitution property) to be defined compositionally. In other words, the property of a program can be defined from the properties of its subprograms. Such features provide foundation for future work.
Program security. The state environment resulting from the analysis offers a common ground for the definition of security properties based on the fundamental property of term substitution. Thus far, we have provided definitions for the information leakage and authenticity breach threats. We plan to extend the framework to define other security properties, like communication security, freshness, anonymity and non-interference-based security. Such unifying frameworks exist in literature, the most notable one being [5] , based on the non-interference property.
Related work
The work presented in this paper builds directly on previous work documented in [6] [7] [8] [9] . In [8, 7] , a denotational semantics and a static analysis for the -calculus is constructed. The analysis captures the property of name substitution and defines secrecy properties. The current paper represents an expansion on [6] , with more detail on the theory included. Full details are included in the Ph.D. thesis of [9] .
The control flow analysis approach has been adopted on a number of occasions by [10, 11, 12, 13] , in which the flow logics approach [14] is used to predict certain security properties pertaining to mobile systems, like the confinement of private information and the adherence to the Bell-La Padula properties [15] . The main analysis focuses on the usage of channels and the values sent over them in the -calculus. In particular, a fresh name is associated with a superset of the set of names that can be communicated over that name. Also, an input parameter is associated with a superset of the set of names that may substitute it at runtime. One major drawback with the manner by which the analysis is carried out is that it identifies all the copies of a fresh name arising from the restriction operator. This implies that non-uniform properties of names that change between the different runs of systems cannot be expressed straightforwardly. The analysis also suffers from the inability to detect certain deadlocks arising from situations where the channel of communication is a fresh name with restricted scope.
The separation between the problem of validating a given solution and the construction of such a solution as formulated by the flow logics approach, meant that the resulting analyses of [10, 11] are targeted towards the validation of a proposed solution rather than offering a constructive algorithm. However, a minimum solution for the validating analysis is proven to always exist, and in [12] , a constructive algorithm for this minimum solution is also supplied assuming a finite set of names. The security properties dealt with in [10, 11] are all based on the main control flow analysis. In [10] , the confinement problem of private names is the main property. In [11] , the no read-up/no write-down property introduced by Bell and La Padula [15] is investigated. This property is often regarded in the security literature as a rigid form of security.
Finally, [13] provides a control flow analysis for a variant of the spi calculus with history-dependent cryptography using the idea of confounders in encrypted messages. This facilitates the comparison of ciphertexts since, for example, {0, (ν r)} k / = {1, (ν r)} k . The paper establishes two main results. First, it shows that the Dolev-Yao definition of secrecy [16] is expressible in terms of a control flow analysis. No specification of the Dolev-Yao most general attacker is provided; instead, it is computed using an approximation relation. The second result establishes that the analysis can capture the form of non-interference stated in [17] . This result elegantly separates between the issues of confidentiality and non-interference using the control flow analysis approach.
Abstract interpretation has been applied effectively to the analysis of mobile systems. Notable works include [4, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] . In [4] , a sound non-uniform description of how topologies evolve in closed systems that do not contain nested replications is presented. The approach is based on the abstract data structures of [23] , where the abstract meaning of a process in the -calculus is represented as an undirected hypergraph (a hypergraph is a graph where an edge can connect more than two vertices) signifying the sequence of internal computations that evolve within a process from its initial specification. The analysis was further developed and greatly simplified in [18] , where a refined semantics is introduced to capture the instance of a channel that establishes a link between two processes.
The study of system interactions in [18] has inspired the analysis of [20] , where the main theme is detecting the leakage of confidential information in the presence of unknown contexts. The analysis is non-uniform and can distinguish between the different instances of a process. The open semantics takes into account the lack of specification of the intruder processes and unlike [4, 18] , the analysis is not restricted to systems with no nested replications. Encoding the ability to deal with unknown specifications into the semantics is a different alternative to our approach, which adopts a specification of the intruder (in our case the Dolev-Yao most general attacker).
The analysis of [20] was extended in [21] in an occurrence counting analysis for detecting the exhaustion of resources, mutual exclusion and deadlock properties. On the other hand, a more generic parametric framework has been proposed in [22] , which is capable of expressing the equality and inequality relations between names, i.e. the dependency among names at their creation point. The abstract interpretation approach has been used by [19] to approximate cryptographic protocols specified in a cryptographic language with finite principals and sessions (the spi calculus allows infinite principals and sessions) using tree automata. An implementation of the analysis exists. However, it has been applied to small protocols with finite runs only (mostly single runs).
Type systems have been extensively researched within the mobile systems and security community and notable examples include the works of [17, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29] , where properties related to information privacy, resource access control and trust are tackled.
In [24] , a typing system is suggested for a distributed variant of the -calculus called D , where processes reside at named locations and communications occur locally. In order to be able to express remote communications, a process movement primitive is introduced. The typing system introduces the notion of location types, where each location is typed by the resources available to agents residing at that location. This will control the set of capabilities that an agent can perform at a certain location. For example, the agent may be able to send but not to receive data. Runtime errors are then used to express the breach of type safety. These errors can detect illegal movements of processes as well as illegal communications.
In [25] , dynamic type checking is used to deal with malicious unspecified agents moving between different sites. Open secure semantics are given for the language of D , where special bad types are used to distinguish untyped code in what is known as a partial typing system, where only a subset of agents is well-typed. Filters are used by sites to judge the trustworthiness of an incoming agent. Based on this judgement, a notion of authority from which trust between the different sites harbouring processes can be built. Hence, the need for dynamic type checking is, in fact, reduced. The correctness of the behaviour of well-typed processes is shown to be sound with respect to well-behaving sites.
A more extensive treatment of the subject of trust in mobile systems modelled by the -calculus is given in [29] . Here, a system of Boolean annotations is used to guarantee that only trusted data are used in trusted contexts. The system relies on a notion of trust during run time. An algorithm for creating the general types of the system is also suggested.
In [27] , two security properties, the resource access control and information flow properties, are dealt with in a typing system for a variant of the asynchronous -calculus [30, 31] with security levels. Using a security policy that assigns levels to processes, a process can only access resources that were created by processes running at the same or lower levels. Similarly, a process can only write to resources created by higher-level processes. On the other hand, implicit flow of information is dealt with by a notion of non-interference, which depends on a form of may-testing.
An advanced static type checking system is used in [28] to guarantee secure information flow for general process behaviour in the polyadic -calculus extended with extra syntactic constructs. In this typing system, non-linear types are used as part of a finite partially ordered set of action types. The action type of a process is an abstraction of the causal dependency among the free channels of that process. With the use of secrecy indices, a subject reduction property of the resulting typed processes is given. This implies that composing a typed process with external processes does not change its internal secrecy. The subject reduction property is then used to express a form of non-interference among low-level and high-level processes. The resulting system is also used to embed the system of [32] , using typed process representation.
One of the major drawbacks of type systems is their inability to express non-uniform properties due to the fact that they associate the same type with the different runs of the system. In [26] , this problem was remedied by introducing a primitive for fresh type creation. Special channel types called Groups can be created, where names of a type belonging to a particular group cannot be communicated over channels of another group type (possibly with a lower secrecy level). This will protect against the leakage of secret channels from one group to another.
It seems, to date, that the work of [17] has assumed an authoritative role in the subject of security and types in the spi calculus. This is simply due to the wealth of basic concepts that the work contains, and in particular, the idea of mixing (primitively) typed and untyped data in the typing system and the idea that every participant in a security protocol must be typable. An overall view of secrecy principles is also given in the context of the spi calculus. The proposed typing system guarantees the protection of secret data against leakage through a notion of non-interference that is based on testing equivalence. However, the system does not clarify the issue of principal types and therefore, no complete and sound typing algorithm is provided.
Another extension of the asynchronous -calculus, termed the security -calculus is suggested by [33] that incorporates a type system where security levels and read/write capabilities are associated with input parameters and restricted names. May and must testing equivalences are then formalised for the language and based on these equivalence formalisations, notions of non-interference are enforced. The work is a comprehensive extension of the earlier work presented in [27] .
Finally, the compositional security checker (CoSeC) developed in [34] is a static analysis tool that builds on the Concurrency Workbench [35] . Both tools are forms of semantics-based model checkers that can check for properties of processes based on different equivalences and preordering. The language of input for CoSeC is an extension of CCS with separately marked high-level and low-level observable actions. The treatment of the tool benefits only finite state systems and is targeted towards the checking of the non-deducibility-on-compositions property.
Other approaches. Other approaches that cannot be directly classified under the previous headings or that may cover more than one approach have also been suggested and implemented. The work of [36] is an early attempt to present an abstract binding-time analysis as part of a meta-interpreter for the -calculus. The analysis adopts a partial evaluation technique, which aims at using the known part of the input data in specialising programs. The results of the analysis can determine the static communications that can be executed at compile-time as well as the set of static variables that do not change during run-time. The main motivation behind the work of [36] was program optimisation rather than security (although the results are general enough to include some notion of security).
The mobility workbench [37] is an example of automated tools that are targeted towards the checking of process equivalences. In particular, the tool checks for the open bisimulation property in the -calculus [38] .
In the work of [39] a typing system is given for a generic version of the spi calculus with constructor/destructor functions. Untyped predicate logic is also used to program a Prologbased protocol checker that verifies secrecy properties. The methodology is extended, in [40] , to check for the authenticity property. The equivalence of the two approaches is established. In [41, 42] , a trace analysis is built over a symbolic version of the operational semantics of the spi calculus, and in [43] , a well-crafted approach to the symbolic analysis of cryptographic processes, in general, is formalised. Earlier attempts to use symbolic semantics in the analysis of security protocols include [44, 45] , where the reachability problem in the cryptographic protocols is discussed.
The works of [46, 47] have concentrated on the use of automatic checking of equivalences of processes in the spi calculus. The former presents a framework for a trace-based analysis of cryptographic protocols, whereas the latter defines a new equivalence, known as fenced bisimilarity, which removes some of the infinite quantifiers associated with testing equivalence in the spi calculus.
Finally, we mention the works of [48, 49] . In [48] , belief logics have been used to analyse a number of cryptographic protocols and the paper is a notable piece of work. The model checking approach has also been used with the Brutus checker for a dialect of the spi calculus in [49] . More recently, the mobility model checker (MMC) has been introduced in [50] , as a model checker for the -calculus, which uses tabled logic programming.
Denotational models of mobility. Several denotational semantic models have been introduced for the -calculus over the past few years [51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 3] . Apart from a few examples, the majority of these works adopt an approach based on category theory.
The models of [54, 3] are closely related in their underlying theory. Both are fully abstract with respect to late bisimilarity and equivalence. The major difference between the two is that [54] defines the semantics in terms of an internal meta-language for the main category. The language is, in fact, a type-equational theory based on a typed -calculus with non-deterministic summation and recursion. The interpretation of processes is then given by translating into this meta-language. On the other hand, the model of [3] is more abstract and concentrates on properties of the categorical solution.
Stark's model was further refined in [53] using presheaf categories. These are more flexible as they support function spaces and offer models for synchronisation trees and event structures. Unlike the models of [54, 3] , the resulting model is capable of expressing early, as well as, late semantics and hence, it is fully abstract with respect to early bisimilarity and equivalence. Since our static analysis framework is not designed to necessarily deal with the early version of the semantics, we opted for the less elaborate model given in [3] .
Two set-theoretic denotational models are presented in [56] that are fully abstract with respect to may-and must-testing in the -calculus. The models are obtained as solutions of domain equations in a functor category and are quite close to the works of [54, 3] . A higherorder version of the -calculus, where functions as well as names can be communicated over channels, is modelled denotationally in [55] . An internal language is also given for the solution O-category, which is used in the process interpretation. The model is only proven to be fully abstract for transitions in the higher-order language.
Finally, in [51] , a new notion of Cartesian closed double categories is developed from the theory of Cartesian closed categories and used as a basis for the interpretation of the -calculus.
The spi calculus: syntax and structural operational semantics
The basic building blocks in the spi calculus are terms. Terms are divided into primitive and complex. The notion of primitive terms is a refined notion of names that distinguishes between constants, a, b, c, k, A, B, C . . . ∈ N, which cannot be instantiated, and variables, x, y, z, X, Y . . . ∈ V, which can be instantiated. We allow primitive terms to be subscripted with numbers. Complex terms are obtained by applying cryptographic and tuple creation operations. Based on this, Fig. 1 illustrates the syntax of terms, M, N ∈ Term, and of processes, P , Q ∈ P, in the spi calculus. We write k + and k − to distinguish between the public and private parts of a key pair.
Informally, processes are described as follows. A null process, 0, is incapable of evolving any further. An input guard, M(x).P , allows for a process to input a message, N, over a channel defined by M and continues as the residue P [N/x]. An output guard, M N .P , allows a process to send a message, N, over the channel defined by M and continues as P . Although the forms of the input/output actions allow for the generic use of terms as channels, this is only valid for the cases where the term is a name or a variable that is instantiated to a name. The same is required of keys, since keys are treated as names due to their unguessable nature. The restriction, parallel composition, replication and conditional processes are all standard. Tuple-splitting, let (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = M in P , attempts to split a term, M, and binds the resulting components to local variables, x 1 , . . . , x n , in a process P . However, if this fails (i.e. M has an incorrect arity), then the process blocks. Secret-key decryption, case L of {x} N in P , and public-key decryption, case L of {[x]} N in P , attempt to decrypt a term L with key N. If successful, the resulting term is bound to a local variable x in some process, P , otherwise, the process blocks. Similarly, the signature verification process, case L of [{x}] N in P , attempts to verify a term, L, using N and if successful, the resulting term is bound to a local variable, x, in P . Otherwise, if the verification fails, the process blocks. The standard notions of term substitution and α-conversion, as well as the free and bound variables and free and bound names of processes and terms, fv(A), bv(A), fn(A), bn(A), all apply as usual. We also use the notion of bound names and variables of a process, written as bnv(P ) = bn(P ) ∪ bv(P ). Finally, the set of names of a process or a term is written as n(P ) or n(t), respectively. A process P or a term M is closed if fv(P ) = {} or fv(M) = {}. Henceforth, we shall only deal with closed processes and closed terms. Moreover, we only consider systems whose bound names and bound variables are initially distinct from each other and from the set of free names of the particular process.
The language semantics is defined by two relations: the structural congruence relation, ≡, and the labelled transition relation, s −→. The structural congruence relation is defined as the smallest equivalence, closed by the renaming of bound names and variables (α-conversion), that satisfies the following rules: •
otherwise The labelled transition relation is defined in Fig. 2 , closed by the structural congruence of processes.
The s -transitions include input actions, m(x), free output actions, m N , bound output actions, (νn 1 , . . . , νn k )m N (where {n 1 , . . . , n k } ⊆ fn(N)) and silent actions, τ . The rules are described as follows. Rules (OUT) and (IN) express free output and input transitions. Rule (OPEN) transforms a free output to a bound output by restricting names appearing free in the message of communication. Rules (RES) and (PAR) state that transitions are preserved under the restriction and parallel composition operators, provided that the side conditions are satisfied. Finally, communications are carried out in rules (COMM) and (CLOSE) for the cases of free and bound output actions, respectively. The external effects of these communications appear as silent actions, τ .
A domain-theoretic model
We propose, in this section, an extension of Stark's domain-theoretic model [3] . The extension is capable of handling the complexity inherent in the communicated data structures in spi calculus processes as well as the possibility of extruding multiple names through those structures. Consider the following predomain 1 equations, which underlie the primitive behaviour of input, output and silent actions as well as termination or deadlock:
where Spi ⊥ is the domain of processes, In and Out are the predomains of input and output actions, respectively. Input actions are modelled as pairs; a name, N (the channel), and a function, T → Spi ⊥ , that can be instantiated with a term, T , yielding a process in Spi ⊥ . Output actions are divided into free and bound output actions. These are pairs consisting of the channel, N, and either another pair, T × Spi ⊥ , denoting the message, T , and the residue Spi ⊥ (free outputs), or composed functions,
, that introduce new names to the message, T , and the residue, Spi ⊥ (bound outputs). P(−) is Plotkin's powerdomain [57] applied to the disjoint union of input, output and silent actions (the latter represented by Spi ⊥ ) to construct Spi. The one-element predomain, 1, representing terminated (deadlocked) processes is adjoined as in [58, Def. 3.4] . The flat predomain of closed terms, T , is defined as the disjoint union of the predomains of names, N, secret-key ciphers, Sec, public-key ciphers, Pub, digital signatures, Sig and finite tuples, Tup. The predomains Sec, Pub and Sig can be expressed as pairs, where a term, T , is encrypted/signed with a key, N. In addition to the presence of a predomain of terms, there are other differences between these equations and Stark's equations [3] . First, input actions contain a functional element, T → Spi ⊥ , that is capable of being instantiated with any term, not just names. Second, free output actions are also equipped to send messages that are generic terms, T . Moreover, bound output actions are expressed as a finite number of functions, N → · · · N → (T × Spi ⊥ ), that take as arguments names and yield other functions until eventually resulting in a pair representing the message of communication, T , and the residual process, Spi ⊥ . This expresses the fact that bound outputs in the spi calculus can extrude the scope of multiple names, not just one name, as is the case with the -calculus.
A number of continuous mappings leading into Spi ⊥ are also defined, to express the manner in which semantic elements are constructed [58, Def. 3.3] :
The empty set, ∅, is required to represent inactive processes. The singleton map, {| − |}, creates elements of Spi ⊥ from elements of input, output and silent actions. new is used to interpret the effects of restriction. Finally, , is the standard multiset union operator representing non-determinism. We construct a concrete solution for Eqs. (1)- (8) that is based on domain theory. To specify elements of Spi ⊥ , it is necessary to determine elements of all the other semantic domains. We start with the predomain of terms, T . Assuming K is the set underlying any domain, then elements t ∈ K(T ) are defined in Fig. 3 . Due to the assumption that cryptographic functions are total over their arguments, which are of the appropriate type (e.g. keys are names), the predomain of terms, T , appears to be flat with discrete structure and no bottom elements. The disjoint union guarantees that cryptographic terms with similar elements are distinguished from each other as well as from the 2-element tuples (pairs). This is achieved by tagging the cryptographic terms with appropriate tags, sec, pub and sig. From these semantic terms, the concrete elements of the predomains of In and Out are given leading to a solution of Eqs. (1)- (3) specifying elements of the domain of processes, Spi ⊥ . First, elements arising from ∅, {| − |} and are defined in Fig. 4 .
The effects of restricting a name to a process are interpreted by giving a concrete definition of new in terms of the simpler elements arising from ∅, and {| − |} as shown in Fig. 5 . This definition reveals the following points. Restricting a name to ∅ has no effect since this represents a null process. Similarly, restricting a name to the bottom element, {|⊥|}, yields no effect and the final meaning is still undefined. For the case of input actions, restricting the name of the input channel will render the final meaning as that of the inactive process, since no communications can take part over a fresh non-extruded channel. Otherwise, the interpretation of the restriction resumes over the residue without affecting the input variable (assuming that all bound names are distinct). In the case of free output actions, restricting the name of the output message will turn the free output actions into a bound output action. On the other hand, restricting a name in the message of a bound output action will result in adding that name as a λ-variable for the output message. This is required to express the fact that the restricted name's scope is being extruded. It is worth mentioning at this point that one of the main differences in the definition of new here from Stark's definition in [3, §3.2] is that a bound output is allowed to have a finite number of bound names, not just a single name. This is due to the complex nature of messages in the spi calculus (as opposed to pure nominal messages in the -calculus). Finally, the interpretation of restrictions has no effect over silent actions and it is distributed over the choice operator.
The denotational semantics for the spi calculus can now be given as a semantic function S([P ]) ρ φ S ∈ Spi ⊥ defined by the set of rules of Fig. 6 . The multiset, ρ, is used to hold processes composed in parallel with the analysed process. The standard singleton, {| − |} ρ : P → ℘ (P), and the multiset union, ρ : ℘ (P) × ℘ (P) → ℘ (P), are special mappings defined over ρ and should not be confused with {| − |} and defined earlier in (10) and (11), respectively. The environment, φ S : V → T ⊥ , where V is the predomain of variables, captures any term substitutions that occur in the semantics. The special function, ϕ S : 
Note that since we only deal with closed terms, the case where M = x ∈ V and φ S (x) = ⊥ will never be encountered (open terms).
The description of rules (S1)-(S11) is as follows. Rule (S1) interprets the meaning of a null process as the empty set mapping, ∅. Rules (S2) and (S3) deal with processes guarded with input and output actions, respectively. Rule (S3) considers communications between the output channel and appropriate input channels guarding processes in ρ. The φ S is updated in (S3) appropriately with semantic elements. Rule (S4) uses the new mapping to interpret the meaning of a restriction. Rule (S5) interprets directly parallel composition by the addition of the parallel subprocesses to ρ. Rule (S6) interprets a replicated process, !P , as the least upper bound of the infinite poset F. This least upper bound represents the least fixed point of meaning of !P . Due to the fact that the semantic domain, Spi ⊥ , is infinite, the calculation of this least fixed point may not terminate within finite limits. The rule also uses the labelling mechanism to rename all the bound variables and names of the spawned processes by subscripting those variables and names with a number signifying each spawned copy. Since this renaming of bound variables and names is, in fact, α-conversion, the resulting process on the right side of the rule is structurally equivalent to a subprocess of the replication on the left side. This preserves the compositionality of the denotational semantics since the α-converted process is still a subprocess of the replication.
The rest of the rules rely on the meaning of terms as held by the φ S environment before resolving the analysed process. In rule (S7), the meaning of two terms is compared, and depending on the result, P is chosen and added to ρ. Rules (S8)-(S11) deal with tuple splitting and cryptographic processes. The result of the tuple splitting and cryptographic operations are used to update the φ S with the appropriate semantic terms. A residual process, P , signifying the success of the operation is also added to ρ. In case an operation fails, ∅ is returned. Finally, rule (R S 0) is used to interpret the contents of the ρ multiset. We can now state the following theorem. Proof. The soundness property relies on the ability of semantic elements p to match transitions in the operational model. Hence:
On the other hand, adequacy requires that the semantic transitions must be mapped correctly to the operational model. Hence:
The proof of soundness proceeds by induction on the structure of the semantic rules, whereas the proof of adequacy requires a formal approximation relation, p P , between elements p ∈ Spi ⊥ and processes P ∈ P. This relation is popular in similar adequacy proofs in the -calculus.
Non-standard semantics
The standard denotational meaning of a process, as modelled by Spi ⊥ , does not give information on the property we are interested in, i.e. term substitution. Therefore, to trace term substitutions during the evolution of processes, we define a special environment φ E : V → ℘ (T ) that maps each variable of a closed process to the set of semantic terms that may substitute that variable during the evaluation of the meaning of a process. Since the non-standard semantics is precise (copies of bound names and variables are always distinct), each variable will be mapped to a singleton set at most per choice of control flow, representing the term that substitutes the variable.
A domain, D ⊥ = V → ℘ (T ), can be constructed, ordered by subset inclusion:
With the bottom element, ⊥ D ⊥ , being the null environment, φ E0 , that maps each variable to the empty set. The union of environments operation, ∪ φ , can also be defined as follows:
The non-standard semantic domain is formed by pairing D ⊥ with the standard semantic domain, Spi ⊥ , resulting in Spi ⊥ × D ⊥ . The bottom element of this domain is the pair
The non-standard semantics for the spi calculus is defined by the semantic function,
, on the structure of P as in Fig. 7 , where in what follows, we have that fst(x 1 , x 2 ) = x 1 and snd(x 1 , x 2 ) = x 2 . The definition of the ϕ E : (V → ℘ (T )) × Term → T function allows for the meaning of a term to be computed under a particular φ E environment:
Also, the ρ multiset holds all the processes in parallel with the process under interpretation. The semantic rules are described as follows. In rule (E1), the meaning of a null process is described as the pair (∅, φ E ), where φ E is the environment supplied to the rule initially. Rules (E2) and (E3) deal with the cases of input and output actions, respectively. Communications are dealt with in rule (E3) for output actions, therefore, φ E remains unchanged in rule (E2) for input actions. The rule for output actions requires that terms used as channels should evaluate to names, and communications occur whenever an input channel is matched in ρ. The value of φ E is updated with the message term substituting the input parameter. Note that in both rules above for input and output actions, any substitutions occurring inside unmatched guards as a result of communications that may take place between the residue and the rest of processes in ρ, have no effect on the φ A environment, since we are only interested in substitutions resulting from communications between matched output and input actions.
Rule (E4) interprets the meaning of a restriction using the new operation on the first element of the resulting pair, whereas the second element reflects the environment resulting from the residue. This is justified as internal communications are preserved by restriction. Rule (E5) adds two parallel processes to the multiset, ρ. The meaning of a replicated process in rule (E6) is defined as the least upper bound of the poset, F, of non-standard semantic elements. Since the non-standard semantic domain, Spi ⊥ × D ⊥ , is infinite, it may not be possible to calculate this least fixed point within finite limits. Also, α-conversion renames the set of bound names and variables of each process copy, while maintaining the compositionality of the semantics. Rule (E7) deals with a conditional process based on the semantic equality of the compared terms. Pair splitting is dealt with in rule (E8) where the φ E is updated to hold the result of the substitution of local variables by elements of a tuple. The rest of the rules (E9)-(E11) deal with cryptographic processes performing secret-key decryption, public-key decryption and digital signature verification. The φ E is updated for successful operations and returned unchanged otherwise.
The correctness requirement for the non-standard semantics of the spi calculus, with respect to its standard semantics, is expressed in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Correctness of the non-standard semantics).

∀P ∈ P : (S([P
Proof. The correctness requirement can be shown to hold by induction over the structure of the non-standard semantics, comparing in each case with the corresponding rule in the standard semantics. A formal proof would introduce an extraction function that extracts the standard part of the non-standard meaning and then by showing that the standard meaning is equal to the extracted element, it is possible to arrive at the same conclusion as above.
In effect, the theorem states that the standard element of the non-standard semantics is equivalent to the value obtained from the standard semantics. In other words, the standard meaning can be extracted from the non-standard meaning.
Abstract semantics
As we mentioned earlier in the previous section, the non-standard semantics of the spi calculus contains least fixed point calculations that may not be computable (in the rule for replication). To obtain a computable semantics, whose termination is guaranteed, a sound abstraction is required to remove the source of infinite growth in the semantic domain Spi ⊥ × D ⊥ . For example, consider the following simple system:
!((νm)n m .P |n(y).Q)
As a result of the infinite communications within this system, its non-standard semantics will yield (as part of its meaning) an infinite trace of silent actions tau(tau(tau(. . . as well as a φ E environment that maps every instance y j to {m j }, for j = 1 . . . ∞.
We assume a finite predomain of tags, Tag, ranged over by t,ṫ,ẗ, where t is the tag of a generic term,ṫ is the tag of a primitive term (name, variable) andẗ is the tag of a complex term (ciphertext, signature, tuple). Next we tag (sub)terms of the analysed process with unique tags. More precisely, we tag M in the following constructs: We now introduce the α k,k abstraction function, which keeps to a finite level, the number of copies of bound variables, names and tags captured in the abstract semantics.
Definition 1. Define the abstraction, α k
The resulting abstract predomains, V , N and Tag , can be defined as
Informally, k constrains the number of bound variables and names, and tags of primitive terms, whereas k constrains the number of tags of complex terms. In effect, constraining the tags of primitive terms implies limiting the copies of bound names and variables carrying the tags, whereas constraining the number of tags of complex terms means limiting the depth of complex data structures.
For example, in the process !(ν n)a nṫ | !a(x), it is possible to spawn infinite copies of each replication:
It is clear thatṫ is an indicator to the number of copies the new name, n, has after spawning each process. On the other hand, the process !a(x).a {x}ẗ k | a b , which can be rewritten as:
demonstrates the role ofẗ as an indicator to the number of times the ciphertext, {x} k , is applied to the name, b.
Using the α k,k abstraction, we construct the abstract environment φ A : V → ℘ (Tag ), which maps each abstract bound variable of the analysed process to a set of tags, representing terms that could substitute that variable during the abstract semantics. An abstract domain D ⊥ = V → ℘ (Tag ) is formed ordered by subset inclusion:
The bottom element, ⊥ D ⊥ , is the null environment, φ A0 , mapping each variable to { }.
Taking D ⊥ as the abstract semantic domain, we can define the abstract semantics of the spi calculus by the function Fig. 8 .
The semantics utilises the multiset, ρ, to hold all the processes in parallel with the analysed process. The special function,
, returns a set of terms corresponding to a term, M, given substitutions captured by φ A :
The description of the rules is as follows. Rules (A1) and (A2) return the φ A environment unchanged. Communications are dealt with in rule (A3) for output actions, where synchronising output and input channels yield a communication, in which the tag of the message is captured by φ A . The semantics is imprecise, since φ A only captures an abstract tag as a value for an abstract variable. Rules (A4) and (A5) deal with the cases of restriction and parallel composition directly by placing the subprocesses with the rest in ρ.
The rule for replication, (A6), defines the least upper bound of the poset, F, as the least fixed point of the meaning of a replicated process. The following theorem states that, unlike the case for the standard and non-standard semantics, the calculation of the least fixed point in abstract semantics is guaranteed to terminate due to the finite nature of the semantic domain, D ⊥ . The rule for replication also uses the labelling mechanism to α-convert the set of bound names and variables of each copy of the replication, !P , as well as its set of tags. Here fold is the standard folding operator (for sets rather than lists). This renaming does not affect the compositionality of the semantics. The rule for conditional processes, (A7), relies on the equality of two untagged terms under In order to prove the soundness of the abstract semantics, we first have to prove the soundness of the ∪ φ operation.
Lemma 1 (Soundness of the φ operation).
where fold f e {x 1 , . . . , x n } = f (x n , . . . , f (x 1 , e) .
. . ) and sub
Proof. The proof is by mathematical induction on the number of elements of sets of φ A and φ E environments. Full details are included in [9] .
The lemma establishes that for any set of concrete environments, {φ 1 , . . . , φ n }, and their abstract counterparts, {φ 1 , . . . , φ n }, which are related by the abstraction function, α k,k , and the tag evaluation function, value_of, then the unions,
will maintain this relation. Intuitively, the relation states that a term, M, captured by the ϕ E function in the concrete semantics, will appear as a tag, t, in the abstract environment, such that the value of t is equivalent to an abstract form of M, that is (fold sub k,k M bnv(M)).
We can now state the soundness of the abstract semantics as follows.
Theorem 4 (Soundness of the abstract semantics)
.
where fold f e {x 1 , . . . ,
Proof. The proof is by induction over the structure of the abstract and non-standard semantics. Details are included in [9] .
The theorem states that for any term, M, captured in the non-standard semantics by including its ϕ E (φ E , M) value in the value of a variable, φ E (x), then that will correspond to capturing a tag, t, in the abstract semantics, by φ A (α k,k (x)). The appropriateness of t is expressed by the ability to obtain (by folding) an abstract form, fold sub k,k M bnv(M), of the concrete term, M, by evaluating t using value_of and untagging the resulting term, M , using untag. More concisely, every concrete term, M, captured in the non-standard semantics is also captured in the form of the corresponding abstract tag, t, in the abstract semantics.
The main point underlining the theorem is that even though the abstraction prevents the generation of infinite data (data structures), it does so in a sound manner (since t is present in φ A whenever M is present in φ E ) so as not to preclude the analysis of processes that are capable of generating such infinite data (data structures), albeit the produced results are approximate (we can only see an abstract form of M through the tags captured in φ A ).
The Intruder I
The specification of the intruder in the spi calculus is inspired by the model presented by Dolev and Yao [16] . The model describes the general guidelines along which the most general attacker in cryptographic protocols can be specified. This model was shown by [59] to be sufficient to subsume any other adversary and the specification is dependent on the language of choice. In this section, we specify the most general attacking process in the spi calculus. Informally, any such specification should adhere to the following criteria:
• The attacker can read, learn, modify and block any messages passed over the network's public channels, as well as create fresh messages. It can also send the messages it has in its knowledge to other processes.
• The attacker can compose tuples from learnt messages and can decompose learnt tuples to their basic elements.
• The attacker can apply cryptographic operations, such as encryption, decryption etc. to any of the messages it has in its knowledge using any of the keys it knows. The above features can be stated more formally in the spi calculus by the specification of Fig. 9, where κ init = (M 1 , . . . , M n ) is the initial knowledge of the intruder represented as a tuple. If n = 0, then we write κ init = ( ). The specification contains the subprocess i κ init , which initialises the knowledge of the intruder by communicating with the input process, i(κ), and hence, yielding the substitution, κ = κ init . Although it is possible for κ init to take any value, in our analysis of security protocols, we set κ init = (M 1 , . . . , M n ) , where for the analysed process, P , running in parallel with I , we have that {M 1 , . . . , M n } ⊆ fn(P ). 2 Moreover, we refer to the set of terms underlying the tuple, κ (resp. κ init ), as set (κ) (resp. set (κ init )). The knowledge of the intruder, κ, is increased due to the value-passing behaviour whenever input actions occur or fresh data are created as part of bound output actions. κ also increases due to the value-processing behaviour whenever decryption, signature verification or tuple-splitting operations succeed. In both cases, standard tuple concatenation, + : Term × Term → Term, is used.
Apart from the initialisation process i κ init , the rest of the specification consists of a replication of processes each of which is guarded by an input action, i(κ), over the special channel i. The input parameter κ is instantiated with tuples of terms. This is necessary to be able to express the fact that I can learn from its own behaviour. For example, in order for κ to obtain the new name net without necessarily outputting net to external processes, I sends net over channel i. Similarly, in order for κ to learn all the terms it has encrypted, signed etc., it needs to send them again over channel i. On the other hand, the main body of the process consists of the parallel composition of all the possible input/output actions and cryptographic operations quantified over all the terms currently in κ.
Security properties
We define in this section security properties based on the results of the abstract interpretation established in the previous section. More precisely, we reason about term substitutions and their secrecy and authenticity implications as a means of gaining information. A process classified at a low secrecy level could input data created by another high-level process, or could decrypt a ciphertext revealing the underlying sensitive plaintext if it has the appropriate key. Similarly, data authenticity could be compromised if an untrusted process succeeds in communicating its data to a highly trusted process.
More formally, assume S = (S L , S , S , S , S , ⊥ S ) and A = (A L , A , A , A ,
A , ⊥ A ) are finite lattices of secrecy and trust levels, respectively, where l, l ∈ S L and a, a ∈ A L . A well-defined security policy then classifies all the bound names and variables of a system with their secrecy and trust levels using S and A, and according to the security requirements of the processes to which those names and variables are bound.
Furthermore, let ξ S : (N ∪ V) → S and ξ A : (N ∪ V) → A be two environments that map bound names and variables to their secrecy and trust levels, respectively. Hence, ξ S (a) is the secrecy level of a, and ξ A (a) is the trust level of a. The null environments are defined as: ∀x ∈ N ∪ V : ξ S0 (x) = ⊥ S , ξ A0 (x) = ⊥ A . 3 One may define the following secrecy and authenticity threats.
Definition 2 (Information leakage).
A name, a, is said to be leaked within a process, P , if and only if:
Definition 3 (Authenticity breach). The authenticity requirement of a variable, y, is said to be breached within a process, P , if and only if:
The information leakage property captures instances where high-level names substitute low-level variables. Note that the property only captures the secrecy of names, as opposed to the secrecy of ciphertexts. This stems from our assumption that names are the only sensitive data whose secrecy may be compromised. Ciphertexts provide a secure mechanism with which the secure transmission of names is achievable. For example, in the process, a k .a {m} k | a(x).a(y).case y of {z} x in P , it is the secrecy of m, rather than {m} k , that is undermined by P .
On the other hand, the direction of the ordering relation in the authenticity property clearly demonstrates the difference in concern. Intuitively, an authenticity breach occurs whenever a tag, whose name value has a low trust level, instantiates a variable with a higher trust level. Hence, we are concerned with highly trusted processes obtaining data not at the same level of trust. This could be as a result of that data originating from malicious sources. Notice again (as in information leakage above) that only names are captured and not complex structures, like digital signatures. This is due to the assumption that digital signatures only provide the means by which names (data) are transmitted in an authentic manner over public channels. For example, in the process,
P expects a different name, m , to instantiate y, then it is m, rather than [{m}] k − , that breaks the authenticity requirement that P expects from y. We next explain the above secrecy and authenticity properties in light of the SPLICE/AS protocol.
Example: The SPLICE/AS protocol
The SPLICE/AS protocol was first suggested by [60] as a public-key protocol that establishes authentication between two agents. The protocol was found flawed in [61] , and two attacks were published that allowed the intruder to impersonate initiators and responders.
Here, we consider the modified version of the protocol as suggested in [61] , where we have removed the messages dealing with the distribution of the public keys as in [62] , and assumed that both the initiator and the responder have obtained each other's public keys in a secure manner. Then the resulting sequence of messages describes the protocol, where N is a nonce (we have further omitted timestamps):
These messages establish authentication between an initiator and a responder whenever the responder verifies successfully the digital signature created by the initiator in the first message and the initiator receives back its nonce from the responder in the second message. One may include Messages 3 and 4 to indicate that both the initiator and the responder are confident enough to exchange secret messages:
where we have assumed that nonce N is used as a shared session key. Alternatively, a separate session key K could be created by the initiator and sent to the responder. The specification of the modified SPLICE/AS protocol in the spi calculus is given in Fig. 10 . The continuation processes of Init and Resp are denoted by F and F , respectively (F and F are arbitrary dummy values and do not play any role in the analysis). In this specification, we have used non-recursive definitions Init(X, Y ) and Resp(X, Y ) to describe the behaviours of the protocol initiator and responder participants. Here, X is an agent variable representing the identity of the initiator and Y is an agent variable representing the identity of the responder. Both X and Y may be instantiated by agent names A, B, C . . . . Hence, It is important to distinguish at this point between the concept of a role and that of an agent. Init and Resp are roles that can be played by the same agent or by different agents. In general, we assume from now on the presence of two honest agents, A and B. In addition to these agents, the intruder I exists and it is specified as in Section 8 by the Dolev-Yao model. Agents A and B are honest in the sense that they can assume no other specification apart from the Init(X, Y ) and Resp(X, Y ) processes. For example, agent A can act as Init in one session and as Resp in the next. As a result, it is necessary to include all the possible combinations involving two agents A and B as is done in the specification of the Protocol process. Additionally, when A (or B) acts as the initiator or the responder of the protocol (playing the Init or Resp role), it has the option of communicating with the intruder I . Therefore, the specification must allow for this possibility equally as well by including the options 4 The results show the name values for untag(ϕ A (φ A , x) ) for some of the variables, x. The intruder is also capable of constructing further complex terms from the name subset (φ A , κ) ). Examining the results of the abstract interpretation, we find a few irregularities (which we have underlined to draw the attention of the reader). The intruder was successful in capturing nonce N AB1 created by A as initiator to B and nonce N BA1 created by B as initiator to A. Messages M AB1 and M BA1 created in sessions between A and B were also captured. Additionally, we find that initiators, in communication sessions involving A and B only, have captured messages from, I , that can be any of I 's names.
In the next section on security analysis, we explain these anomalous results in the light of an impersonation attack (mentioned by [62] , to the initiator's identity (A in this case). Further formalisation of the security breaches of this attack is given in the next section on security properties. Note that to be able to capture the attack proposed by Lowe in [63] , it is necessary to use a non-uniform analysis (i.e. k > 1 and k > 1 in α k,k ), since this attack mainly breaches the freshness property of messages. For simplicity, we only consider the uniform case.
Authenticity. To discuss the authenticity property of the SPLICE/AS protocol as specified in Fig. 10 , we use the following trust-level classifications, where ⊥ A a:
Examining the results of Fig. 11 in light of the above values for ξ A , we find that authenticity is breached. For example, consider the value of the msg1 AB1 variable, which belongs to agent A acting as the initiator of the protocol to agent B. Here, we find that the result net 1 ∈ untag(ϕ A (φ A , msg1 AB1 )) is possible, and due to the classification ξ A (net 1 ) ξ A (msg1 AB1 ), we have an instance of authenticity breach (Definition 3). A similar breach also occurs with the msg1 BA1 name.
Secrecy. We adopt the following classification of secrecy levels, where ⊥ S l:
The results of Fig. 11 demonstrate breaches in the information leakage property, as the intruder captures data created by agents A and B in sessions involving these two agents. For example, consider M AB1 ∈ set (untag(ϕ A (φ A , κ) )), which is a message created by A initiating a session with B. Given that ξ S (κ) ξ S (M AB1 ), we have an instance of Definition 2.
Example: The secure FTP server
We consider here a simple secure file transfer protocol (FTP) system:
login(res).case res of {result} k in 0)
The three start signals spawn three instances of the Client/Server system and the fourth I_start signal allows the intruder, I , to participate in a session with the server. Each instance of the client/server system shares a session key, k, that is not reusable in subsequent sessions. Additionally, communications between the server and the client or intruder processes are carried out over a public login channel, login. The client process sends the request encrypted with the session key and then waits for the result back from the server, which it then decrypts using the same key. The server process accepts an encrypted request and deals with it. For simplicity, the server just routes back the request over the login channel encrypted with the session key, and then, it terminates.
Assuming the intruder's initial knowledge is set to κ init = {login, k}, and applying A([ftp]) {| |} ρ φ A0 , with α 1,1 (uniform analysis), then converting back from tags to names using the untag function, we obtain values for κ → {net 1 , request 1 , login, k 1 } and result 1 → {net 1 , request 1 , login, k 1 } in the resulting φ A . The interpretation detects that the intruder is capable of obtaining the request name and that the result variable captures other values than the original request. These are false positive values since the uniform analysis does not distinguish between the different copies of k. Therefore, it appears to be possible for the intruder to decrypt any of the ciphertexts outputted over login. Moreover, it is impossible to distinguish between the information each instance of the client and server processes obtains.
To refine the above results, we increase the values of k and k from α 1,1 to α 4, 4 . The intermediate values of k = 2, k = 2 and k = 3, k = 3 will still yield the above false positives for k = 1, k = 1 (since the intruder's session interferes with clients' sessions), therefore, we do not include them here. However, when performing the analysis for k = 4, k = 4, we obtain κ → {net 1 , net 2 , net 3 , net 4 , login, k 4 }, result 1 → {request 1 }, result 2 → {request 2 } and result 3 → {request 3 }. These values reveal that the intruder is incapable of obtaining information from sessions involving clients. Also, a more precise distribution of information between the three copies of the client and server processes is reflected in the results.
Another version of the FTP system may contain a faulty client specified as:
The specification of the client reveals, over the public covert channel covert channel, its session key, which it shares with the server, to the intruder. Performing the static analysis for α 1,1 and setting the knowledge of the intruder to κ init = {covert, login, k}, we ob-
Refining the analysis further by setting α 4,4 reveals that the intruder, in fact, can only capture the session key (since the client reveals it over the covert channel), since,
These results reveal that the intruder is incapable of compromising the system, even in the case where it compromises the password of each client.
Secrecy.
To analyse for secrecy, we adopt the following secrecy levels:
with ⊥ L l. The results of the uniform analysis (with correct client specification) with α 1,1 indicate that the intruder is capable of capturing request 1 , which has a higher secrecy level than κ. Refining these results further, we find that the non-uniform analysis, with α 4,4 , reveals a correct distribution of names to input parameters. In particular, the intruder's knowledge, κ, could not obtain any names with higher secrecy levels and remained limited to names like net and login and its own key, k 4 . However, examining the results of the non-uniform analysis (with faulty client specification) with α 4,4 , we find that Definition 2 is satisfied and an information leakage occurs. This secrecy breach occurs with the value of κ, which captures the secret session keys, k 1,2,3 . Since ξ S (k 1,2,3 ) = l and ξ S (κ) = ⊥ L according to the above name classification, we have that ξ S (κ) ξ S (k 1,2,3 ). It is clear that this breach happened as a result of the client sending its session key over the covert channel, which is a free name recognised by the intruder.
Authenticity. we adopt here the following classification for trust levels:
with ⊥ A a. In both analyses (with correct and faulty client specifications), using α 4,4 , we find that input parameters captured the appropriate names and no instance of the process authenticity breach occurred (Definition 3). The case of the faulty client is interesting, since the intruder, I , failed in passing its low-level data to the clients, even though it clearly breaches the secrecy of their session keys as indicated above. This is due to the fact that the keys are per session, i.e. each time a copy of the system is spawned the keys are renamed. Hence, the intruder cannot use a key it obtains from the client in the intruder's own session with the FTP server. Hence, the authenticity property is preserved despite a failure in the secrecy property of the protocol.
Spicaso: a spi calculus analyser for security objectives
The static analysis developed in the previous sections was implemented in an initial prototype, Spicaso, using Objective Caml (OCaml) version 3.02. The main modules of the program are stated in the following paragraphs.
Module Term. This module defines the structure of terms in the spi calculus. The main data type in this module is term, and its definition is shown in Fig. 12 . For simplicity, we only considered 2-element tuples (pairs).
SECCIPHER is the secret-key ciphertext constructor, PUBCIPHER is the public-key ciphertext constructor and SIGCIPHER is the digital signature constructor. The first element of each constructor represents the plaintext and the second represents the encryption/signature key. Names are represented by NAME, variables by VAR, private keys by PRV_KEY and public keys by PUB_KEY. Secret session keys are instantiated as names, constructed by NAME. For example, the complex term [{(x, (n, {m} k ))}] k − is represented as:
Term.SIGNATURE(Term.PAIR(Term.VAR("x"), Term.PAIR(Term.NAME("n"),Term.SECCIPHER(Term.NAME("m"), Term.NAME("k'")))),Term.PRV_KEY(Term.NAME("k"))) Module Process. The module denotes what a process is in the spi calculus. This is defined in Fig. 13 . The module also provides operations for substitutions of terms and the renaming of bound names, variables and tags. Although the use of type term is generic in the definition of the process type, we still assume the appropriate usage of names as channels and secret session keys. Other keys must also have the appropriate type. In the case of SPLIT, the first term is the pair to be split. The subsequent terms are the variables instantiated by the two elements of the pair. These variables are bound to the first process. Similarly, for the case of the secret-key decryption construct, SECDECRYPT, the first term represents the ciphertext to be decrypted, using the second term (a name). The result, if successful, is bound to the third term in the first process. The same applies to publickey decryption, PUBDECRYPT, and digital signature verification, SIGVERIFY. The process module also includes the environments, tag_to_term and term_to_tag, mapping tags to terms and vice versa.
Module Phi. This module holds mappings from variables to sets of tags. The main type here is phi = (term * term list) list, where the generic term will only be used for the particular case of NAME.
Module Rho. This module has one main type: rho = Process.process list which represents the ρ multiset of processes. Future work related to the Spicaso tool will concentrate on analysing and enhancing the performance of the tool as well as using the non-uniformity of the φ A in defining other security properties, mainly freshness.
Conclusion
We have presented in this paper a non-uniform static analysis for infinite systems with cryptographic capabilities specified in the language of the spi calculus. The analysis is characterised as being fully compositional since it follows the denotational approach. This facilitates the implementation of the analysis in functional programming and provides handy mathematical tools, like least fixed points and domains.
As part of the overall approach, the paper also defined a denotational semantics for the spi calculus that is a direct extension of Stark's domain theoretic model describing processes in the -calculus. This semantics was then extended to a non-standard semantics that captures the property of term substitutions when communications and cryptographic operations take place, in addition to capturing the standard meaning. However, in order to arrive at a computable analysis, the concrete non-standard semantics was then abstracted to operate over a finite domain. A couple of security properties, the information leakage and authenticity breach, were then defined based on the results of the analysis. Given a specification of the Dolev-Yao attacker, an example protocol, SPLICE/AS, was then analysed for these security properties.
There are a number of directions that the static analysis can be extended towards. In particular, other security properties can be accommodated like communication secrecy and message independence. We discuss these two properties very briefly in the following paragraphs. Communication secrecy refers to the secrecy of communicated data with reference to the secrecy levels of the channels over which the data are communicated. This is different from Definition 2 (Section 9), since it is a name-channel rather than a namevariable relationship. For example, consider the simple system, (ν b)c b .P |c(z).Q, where ξ S (b) = ξ S (z) = l and we set ξ S (c) = ⊥ S l. Then, it is clear that b is not leaked to z. However, b is sent dangerously over c, since its secrecy level is higher than that of c.
To be able to capture breaches in the communication secrecy, the channel over which a term travels must be associated with that name. For example, it is possible to include in the meaning of a process, an environment, Tag → ℘ (N), mapping every message, as represented by its tag, to a set of possible channels over which the message is sent. Such association could be used then to compare the level of the message to the levels of its possible channels. The presence of a channel with a lower secrecy level indicates an insecure communication.
Also, in our static analysis, it is possible to detect a weak form of the message independence property, which relies on a special equivalence that we term abstract testing equivalence. Intuitively, assuming that, A([P | I ]) ρ φ A = φ AP and A([Q | I ]) ρ φ A = φ AQ , are the results of analysing processes P and Q in parallel with the intruder, I , then P is abstract testing equivalent to Q, written as P A Q, if and only if φ AP (κ) = φ AQ (κ). In other words, the intruder is incapable of distinguishing (using its knowledge, κ), between running in parallel with P and running in parallel with Q. Now, assume that an open process, P (x), is a process that can be instantiated by substituting a variable, x, for any name, m, which yields the instance P [m/x]. P (x) then is said to be abstract message-independent with respect to the intruder, I , if and only if ∀m, n ∈ N : P [m/x] A P [n/x]. This implies that choosing any two names in N to obtain instances of P (x) should always result in the same abstract knowledge of the intruder composed with each of those instances. Hence, the intruder cannot find any difference when abstractly interpreted in parallel with P [m/x] from P [n/x].
Finally, an interesting direction for future research would be to investigate security properties that change across the different sessions of a protocol, for example, message freshness. We recognise that such properties will require a non-uniform set-up for our static analysis, in order to be able to distinguish between two or more copies of the same name.
